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The Reluctant Metaphysicians
Samuel M. Brown

Review of Catherine L. Albanese. A Republic of Mind and Spirit: A Cultural History of American Metaphysical Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007; John L. Brooke. The Reﬁner’s Fire: The Making of
Mormon Cosmology, 1644–1844. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994; Wouter J. Hanegraaff. Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected
Knowledge in Western Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012; D. Michael Quinn. Early Mormonism and the Magic World View.
Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1987, 1998; Leigh Eric Schmidt. Hearing
Things: Religion, Illusion, and the American Enlightenment. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000; Randall Styers. Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and Science in the Modern World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Introduction
IN THE SUMMER OF 1829, Jesse Smith of Stockholm, New York, wrote an
angry letter to his nephew Hyrum in response to a query about the Book
of Mormon, which was being translated by Hyrum’s brother Joseph Jr.
Among other complaints, Uncle Jesse described Joseph Jr.’s new scripture
as “discovered by the necromancy of inﬁdelity.”1 These words do not
1. Jesse Smith (Stockholm, New York) to Hyrum Smith (Palmyra, New York), 17 June
1829; transcribed in Joseph Smith Letterbook, 1837–1843, Joseph Smith collection, 1827–
1844, Correspondence, 1829–1844, 2:59–61, LDS Church History Library, Salt Lake
City. Other contemporary references to Smith’s “necromancy” include Eber D. Howe,
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carry the same meaning they once did, but how to translate them isn’t
entirely clear. Necromancy often meant magic, but it also carried the
sense of a frightful magic concerned with conjuring the dead, commonly
treasure demons. Inﬁdelity meant atheism, a broad and charged term that
indicted most forms of non-Protestant belief. Whatever its precise meaning, Jesse’s phrase cast his visionary nephew in a terrible light. For almost
two centuries these and similar critical scowls at Joseph Smith and the
Mormonism he founded have driven the narrative and interpretive approaches to Mormonism among critics, defenders, and onlookers.
Nearly two centuries later, discussions about the intersections of
magic, heresy, and religion in Mormonism mostly exemplify the French
aphorism “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” (The more things
change, the more they stay the same). Many contemporary discussions
still repeat old debates about religious legitimacy just as they were originally framed in the nineteenth century. In the last two decades, a handful
of studies have attempted to break the pattern and provide a scholarly
view into the cultural tensions surrounding the religious meanings of
Mormonism and magic. These books, combined with the scholarly and
public context in which they occur, demonstrate a slow movement away
from approaches dominated, however inadvertently, by an uncritically
Protestant worldview. Though the road has been rocky, several books
have done much to further the discussion. This essay engages this literature, mostly in the context of religious studies, by considering what it
means, and has meant, to call early Mormonism “magic” or Joseph Smith
a “magician.”

Mormonism Unvailed: Or, A Faithful Account of That Singular Imposition and Delusion,
from Its Rise to the Present Time (Painesville, OH: E. D. Howe, 1834), 12, 31–32, 43,
94; and Daniel Parrish Kidder, Mormonism and the Mormons: A Historical View of the
Rise and Progress of the Sect Self-styled Latter-day Saints (New York: Lane & Sandford,
1842), 29.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/msr2/vol1/iss1/13

2

Brown: The Reluctant Metaphysicians
Brown/The Reluctant Metaphysicians 117

Section 1: Magic and metaphysics
In the 1970s, the LDS Church hired Leonard Arrington, an economic
historian, to lead its history department and begin to sort through its incredible archival resources. New documents came fast and furious as Arrington’s group began to process these archives, opening narratives of
Mormon history that diverged at times, sometimes sharply, from prior
institutional accounts. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century devotional
historiography had framed church history as scripture in an extension
of the supernatural rationalism of early Mormonism, while academic history generally bracketed or excluded the supernatural. The Arrington
period was the ﬁrst time that Mormon historians moved beyond history
as scripture in any sustained way, but it remained a fact that clear partisan
lines were drawn in the sand and single documents as proof texts could
exert disproportionate inﬂuence. The presence of ex-Mormon and evangelical countercultists on the one side and a conservative institutional
church on the other increased the stakes of any historical discussion.
Within the overall context of polemical controversy and the Arrington period (later dubbed the “New Mormon History”), Michael Quinn
published his book Early Mormonism and the Magic World View in 1987,
an exhaustive and sometimes exhausting litany of “magical” items, dates,
practices, and possible exposures for Joseph Smith, his family, and his followers. Magic World View reiterates, albeit with the scientiﬁc authority of
prolix footnotes, the old polemical claim that Joseph Smith was a magician.2 The content and context of Quinn’s book led to harsh, even cruel,

2. D. Michael Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1987, 1998). Most of the evidence adduced in Magic World View was tangential, circumstantial, or contextual—of the two main “smoking guns” in which people
close to Smith explicitly endorsed folk “magical” practices, one proved to be a forgery and
the other was misinterpreted. The “salamander” letter tying Smith to typical early modern
treasure magic practices was a Hofmann forgery, as recounted in Linda Sillitoe and Allen
Roberts, Salamander: The Story of the Mormon Forgery Murders (Salt Lake City: Signature
Books, 1988). Quinn misreads (ﬁrst edition, pp. ix, 127–33, 128n5; 2nd edition, pp. xi–
xii, 152, 330n14, 465n124, 467n137, 469n157) Lucy Mack Smith’s ostensible confession
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criticism from many orthodox Latter-day Saints. Quinn, a smart historian
with an encyclopedic knowledge of early Mormonism, became a sort of
casualty in an internecine battle among Latter-day Saints about the
meaning of their tradition. Although it drew some of its momentum
from the Mark Hofmann forgeries, Quinn’s Magic World View relied primarily on evidence not terribly different from that discussed in Jon Butler’s more inﬂuential book Awash in a Sea of Faith (1990), which
documented the persistence and inﬂuence of esoteric folk traditions in
early America, or Alan Taylor’s work on the “supernatural economy” of
late colonial America.3
Yet scholarly writing about magic was already in the process of moving on in the 1980s, leaving Quinn and his critics outmoded before publication of the revised edition of Magic World View in 1998. The
argument over whether Joseph Smith was a magician was as old as Mormonism. Changing the terms of the discussion would require greater
scholarly distance.
A scholar of nature religions and women’s studies with an emphasis
on marginal or “new” religious traditions, Catherine Albanese brought
considerable intellectual and textual resources to bear in A Republic of
Mind and Spirit (2007), a survey of American “metaphysical religion.”4
Working through the overall arc of American religious history, Albanese
challenges two predominant theories of the development of American
Christianity. The ﬁrst, represented by William McLoughlin, sees the
story of recurrent evangelical revivals as the critical engine of American

of participation in folk magic. On this see Samuel M. Brown, “Reconsidering Lucy Mack
Smith’s Folk Magic Confession,” Mormon Historical Studies 13/1–2 (Spring–Fall 2012):
1–12.
3. Jon Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1990); and Alan Taylor, “The Early Republic’s Supernatural
Economy: Treasure Seeking in the American Northeast, 1780–1830,” American Quarterly
38/1 (Spring 1986): 6–34.
4. Catherine L. Albanese, A Republic of Mind and Spirit: A Cultural History of American
Metaphysical Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
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religion, in what has been termed the “evangelical thesis.”5 Jon Butler responded in 1990 by arguing that it was the transition from European establishment churches and folk traditions to post-Revolutionary
denominations, rather than the evangelical impulse per se, that drove religious change in America.6 Albanese joined the broader debate by suggesting that there is another important inﬂuence in American religion:
an identiﬁable and persistent metaphysical tradition that did not end
with the close of the eighteenth century but still continues to inform and
challenge America’s religious mainstreams.
Watching for continuities with Renaissance esoteric traditions, Albanese’s Republic of Mind and Spirit encompasses English cunning folk,
Afro-Caribbean shamans, Puritan hermeticists, séance spiritualists, Indian
powwows, phreno-mesmerists and magnetists, Shakers, Fourierists, Christian Scientists, Universalists, Transcendentalists, New Thought and New
Age practitioners, Americanizers of Eastern philosophies (particularly
Buddhism, Taoism, and yoga), Theosophists, and physiological reformers. And, of course, nineteenth-century Mormons. Albanese’s use of the
terms metaphysics and metaphysicians will probably not gain academic
or popular currency for various reasons. Still, like the more standard
term Western esotericism, Albanese’s terminology displaces polemical
terms like magic and occult and captures something of the nature of the

5. William G. McLoughlin, Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform: An Essay on Religion
and Social Change in America, 1607–1977, ed. Martin E. Marty (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1978), as discussed in Albanese, Republic of Mind and Spirit, 2. Paul K.
Conkin provides a sophisticated treatment of mainline Protestantism in The Uneasy Center: Reformed Christianity in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
6. Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith. Keith Thomas’s book Religion and the Decline of Magic
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) previously provided a background on early
modern Europe and the Protestant campaign to eliminate Catholic mysticism from the
reformed church. Frances A. Yates provided the overview of European hermeticism in
Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964),
while Herbert Leventhal had emphasized other aspects of occult culture in his book In
the Shadow of the Enlightenment: Occultism and Renaissance Science in Eighteenth-Century
America (New York: New York University Press, 1976).
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philosophical and spiritual impulse behind the movements whose stories
she tells.
Albanese’s speciﬁc treatment of Mormonism is largely a minor updating of Quinn, whom she cites extensively. Her distinctive claims about
Mormonism are intriguing but incorrect arguments for the male-female
divine dyad in Mormonism and Smith’s theological dependence on Swedenborg. (Smith was probably aware of Swedenborgianism but never a
follower to any important extent.)7 Though she moves beyond Quinn’s
obsolete “magic world view” framing, Albanese’s argument that Mormonism belongs in the tradition of American metaphysical religion is
also not new: critics have been comparing Smith and his followers to various heretics, mystics, and practitioners of Western esotericism almost
since the church was founded. Mormons were Swedenborgians, they
were mesmerists, they were Camisards or the apocalyptic Anabaptists of
early modern Muenster. In the nineteenth century, comparisons to similar heresies mostly represented an argument from providential history—
a view of history that maintained that because Protestantism conquered
America and prior heresies had faded into the past, anything that resembled those heresies was destined for demise.8
While Albanese treats her subjects sympathetically, her classiﬁcation
largely follows the Protestant precedent—these traditions are what
Protestantism is not.9 This is-not-ness can represent merely the Other,
7. The relationship between Smith and Swedenborgianism still awaits a deﬁnitive treatment. On the possibility of a direct encounter, Albanese (Republic of Mind and Spirit,
142) and Brooke (Reﬁner’s Fire, 212; see n. 15 below for full citation) rely on Quinn (Magic
World View, 174, 1987 ed.), who adduces a single quote from a late autobiography of an
erstwhile Swedenborgian who became a prominent Mormon. Mormons did mention
Swedenborgianism occasionally, generally in derisive terms. The entry in Charles Buck’s
extremely popular Theological Dictionary provided a minimal overview of Swedenborgianism for American readers in the early 1800s. I personally doubt Smith knew much
more about Swedenborg than is contained in that entry.
8. Matthew Bowman and I are working on a treatment of competing theologies of history in antebellum Protestantism and early Mormonism currently titled “‘Fragments of
Mormonism’: Ancient History and the Early Mormon Assault on Protestantism.”
9. Jonathan Z. Smith does an excellent job of thinking through the use of “magic” in
comparison and categorization in Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 215–29.
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the this-is-not-me, or it can represent what remains uncategorized after
a binary classiﬁcation. When the world divides into two categories, there
is always a remainder, something left over. Objects in a remainder
demonstrate that the classiﬁcation is not as secure as one might hope.
Such a remainder has various names depending on the context: triton ti,
tertium quid, liminal entity. The category “magic” is such a remainder
when religion and science deﬁne their polar opposition. There is substantial power and risk associated with objects that either span or exist
between the poles of a binary classiﬁcation. As anthropologists have observed for a century, such liminal entities can threaten, destabilize, and
transform.10 In the case of religion and science, magic has allowed science
to remake religion in signiﬁcant ways. By deﬁning speciﬁc elements of
religion as “magical,” science has managed to hollow out religion’s ritual
and supernatural center. (This process makes possible Stephen Gould’s
“non-overlapping magisteria” concept, a culmination of the modern
Protestant and Enlightenment project of disenchanting religion.)11
The disenchantment of religion by naming its various elements “magical” is an interesting topic in its own right. For scholars of religion and
culture, though, the important analytical problem is that the category
“magic” or “metaphysical religion” is a hodgepodge, a miscellany. Studying
a remainder as if it were unitary is generally poor methodology. Saying
something is magic is not saying much with any rigor. The coherence of
the category is an artifact of the observer rather than something true of
the entity under study. Such a categorization primarily facilitates partisan
manipulation. While Albanese celebrates an encyclopedically diverse and
fascinating group of rebels against the Protestant mainstreams and clearly
moves beyond the polemical impulse behind discussions of magic, her
10. See, for example, Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage: A Classic Study of Cultural Celebrations (1909; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Victor Turner,
“Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage,” in The Forest of Symbols:
Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967); and Mary Douglas,
Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (1966; repr., London:
Routledge, 2002).
11. Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New
York: Ballantine Books, 2002).
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project ultimately cannot free itself from the methodological and theoretical limitations of a study of conceptual remainders.
Randall Styers, in his Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and Science in
the Modern World, takes a theoretical and historiographical approach to
magic and modernism and carefully demonstrates the elasticity of these
too-ﬂexible concepts.12 Building on important theoretical work by
Jonathan Z. Smith, Styers outlines how scholars have used the category of
magic as part of their elaborations of religion, science, and modernism.
Styers knows the key thinkers well, describes their arguments with precision and insight, and draws attention to two basic phenomena. First,
scholars and others deﬁned magic as the “bastard sister” of religion as a
way to corral religion into a “rationalist” pasture. Normative Protestantism
became a private, nonmaterial “devotion” in the thinnest sense of the
term. Second, the elaboration of science required magic as a foil and a
place to store past sins or missteps: early science that was visibly religious
or supernaturalist could be dismissed as nonscience. This process created
a sanitized version of science with an impeccable pedigree.
In parallel with the Enlightenment mainstream, the Protestant mainstream found uses for the concept “magic” in its contests with opponents,
particularly internal heretics like the subjects of Albanese’s Republic of
Mind and Spirit. However else this concept has been used, it has helped
to defame and defang critics and opponents to the mainstream. Styers
provides a rigorous approach to understanding this concept and explains
in some respects the methodological problems with prior efforts to analyze a remainder as if it were a unity.
Wouter Hanegraaff, the Dutch holder of one of the few endowed
chairs in esotericism or hermeticism, extended Styers’s arguments within
the much broader space of Western esotericism. While the discipline
within which Hanegraaff wrote remains in its infancy, his Esotericism
and the Academy furthered the debate considerably.13 Struggling with

12. Randall Styers, Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and Science in the Modern World
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
13. Wouter J. Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western
Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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nomenclature as everyone working in this space does, Hanegraaff settles
on the neologism “Platonic Orientalism” to describe key traditions
within Albanese’s “metaphysical religion.”14 Although Platonic Orientalism is a slightly opaque term, Hanegraaff is true to Styers’s insights as he
follows the threads of the heavily interpreted survival of the religion and
culture of the antique Mediterranean. Although he explores some tangents of more modest signiﬁcance, Hanegraaff importantly focuses on a
coherent what: antique Mediterranean culture—especially Egypt-derived
wisdom and late Platonism—as it survives into the modern era. The most
important survivals encompassed some Platonic philosophy, some syncretic henotheism, some Egyptophilia, and some theurgy. Hanegraaff
sees terms like magic or occult or esoteric as words ﬁtted for battle rather
than scholarship, and he is largely correct. While at times overwrought,
his sections on the evolution of these controversial terms represent a useful extension of Styers’s analysis into occultism and esotericism. While
Styers is more rigorous, both authors provide methodological and conceptual tools for beginning to interpret “magic” both within Mormon
history and within the academy writ large.

Section 2: Antique survivals and anti-modernism
Hanegraaff focuses on early and late modern thought, mostly European,
at its intersection with the academy. He correctly identiﬁes the impulse
behind “Platonic Orientalism” and other kindred traditions commonly
grouped under “Western esotericism”: a reverence for antiquity, the persistence of the cosmological worldview, and a reluctance to embrace
modernism in its entirety. More immediately relevant to Mormon studies, between the ﬁrst and second editions of Magic World View, John
Brooke, a prominent American political historian, published an account
of “hermetic” continuities between the Radical Reformation and Mormonism in The Reﬁner’s Fire.15 His Bancroft-winning book became a
14. Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 12.
15. John Brooke, The Reﬁner’s Fire: The Making of Mormon Cosmology, 1644–1844
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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ﬂashpoint of controversy within the insular community of Mormon history, a controversy that demonstrated how separate much of that community still was from other American and religious historians.16 Brooke’s
engaging and informative book provided a plausible trail from the Radical Reformation of sixteenth-century Europe to the religious ferment of
late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century America. While Reﬁner’s
Fire encountered considerable criticism, it suffered from only a few of
the faults of which many Mormon readers accused it. Overall, Brooke
depended too much on Dame Frances Yates’s hermeticism thesis (ﬁrst
elaborated in her 1964 book Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition),
attributed too much conceptual gravity to counterfeiting, and was unable
to provide secure textual evidence of direct hermetic inﬂuence on early
Mormonism beyond Masonry.
But those problems should not distract from the book’s signiﬁcant
contributions. While Brooke occasionally relies on Quinn, he contributes
substantial original insight into various esoteric threads in the Atlantic
world between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries and correctly situated Mormonism within Atlantic culture. Further, Reﬁner’s Fire was
perhaps the ﬁrst book by an academic outsider to take Mormon theology
seriously, as a subject for careful, systematic interrogation. Until a reading
community appreciates the robustness and coherence of an alternative
cultural tradition, it is diﬃcult to frame cultural rebels as anything but
idiosyncratic. With Brooke’s foundation, it became easier to see that Mormonism represented a principled and coherent assault on Protestantism.
Antique survivals like those described by Brooke and Hanegraaff are
a key enemy to the modern project of Enlightenment, a cultural entity
that is itself commonly misunderstood. In Hearing Things: Religion, Illusion, and the American Enlightenment, Leigh Eric Schmidt clariﬁes the
meanings and mechanisms of the American Enlightenment through the
lens of the rising science of acoustics.17 While optics had long been a
16. Jan Shipps, Sojourner in the Promised Land: Forty Years among the Mormons (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 204–18.
17. Leigh Eric Schmidt, Hearing Things: Religion, Illusion, and the American Enlightenment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
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major focus for physicists and philosophers, acoustic science was an upstart discipline. But acoustic science had an important impact not just
directly in the debates over the meaning of sound, but as an exemplum
that clariﬁes what was happening in the broader culture.
Using Enlightenment exposés of the ancient Greek oracles as elaborate ventriloquism, Schmidt ﬂeshed out a compelling narrative about
“modernity” and “Enlightenment.” Schmidt’s story is of disenchantment—
the banishment of God from nature and human experience. In an extreme
form, the overwrought Friedrich Nietzsche declared God dead; in a
milder form, some early Americans subscribed to Deism (a nebulous term
that overlaps roughly with a disenchanted theism). Modernism as disenchantment is a familiar trope in academic writing. By disenchantment
scholars mean any of a number of things: the waning of the cosmological
worldview, the loss of religion/theocracy as the organizing principle of society in the global West, a transition in religion from the medieval
Catholic focus on church community toward the Protestant emphasis on
the believer and his private conscience, or the disruption of divine immanence in the natural world. All of these are accurate depictions, in varying
degrees and at various points in history, of the disenchantment associated
with modernity.
Joseph Smith strongly resisted this disenchantment. This resistance
placed him in many respects on the wrong side of the Enlightenment, as
Schmidt perceptively observes. But Smith simultaneously welcomed
other elements of the Enlightenment project. Smith’s relationship to
modern ideals of Enlightenment, as that of those who followed him, is
complex. Smith loved logical exegesis, enjoyed puzzling through intellectual or theological problems in pursuit of consistent solutions. He
cherished common sense, albeit in a way speciﬁc to him and his followers.18 Smith stands as a reminder that the Enlightenment wasn’t ultimately about rationality per se—people had been rationally religious for

18. Jared Hickman and I explore the meanings of “common sense” philosophy and
theology in Mormonism as part of our work in progress on translation and the Mormon
challenge to modernity.
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a very long time—it was a story about shifting contexts and authority
and axioms.

Section 3: Mormon reluctance
Understanding the historiographic context facilitates comprehension of
an important problem in the study of Mormonism and esotericism: Mormons generally rejected any such comparison. That they rejected the
word magic is unsurprising, as that was mostly a term of simple derision.
But Mormons rejected other, more sophisticated comparisons as well.
What does Mormon rejection of comparisons to Western esotericism
mean? An extreme version of the religious studies technique of epoche,
or bracketing, would require that we take Mormons at their word. If they
say they are not a Western esoteric tradition, then they are not. But that
approach, which largely abandons hope for analytical comparisons, is
not what I am advocating here. Asking questions, “looking under the
hood,” and seeing whether people’s accounts of themselves and their cultural systems accurately describe those cultural systems are the appropriate role of the academic. I am suggesting, though, that the Mormon
reluctance to accept their characterization as practitioners of Western esotericism is worth considering in its own right. The reluctance tells us a
lot about both those comparing and those being compared.
Whereas many practitioners of Western esotericism are explicit
about their dependence on particular esoteric traditions (such a dependence was generally the point of an esoteric tradition), Joseph Smith and
the early Mormons generally rejected any explicit ties with esotericism.
When confronted with Shakers, Fourierists, the French Prophets, Quakers, Swedenborgianists, or mesmerists, Smith denounced them as readily
as he denounced the evangelical groups that attacked him and his movement.19 Smith was not constrained by the authority of an esoteric tradi19. See, for example, Times and Seasons 4/9 (15 March 1843): 137; 5/1 (1 January 1844):
395; 6/5 (15 March 1845): 833; and Scott H. Faulring, ed., An American Prophet’s Record:
The Diaries and Journals of Joseph Smith, 2nd ed. (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1989),
375, entry for 6 May 1843 (contrast B. H. Roberts, A Comprehensive History of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints [Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1980], 5:383).
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tion. Even the treasure quest, to which he brought a surprisingly rich vision of matter and the resurrected earth, met with denials and rejections
on Smith’s part.20 While he engaged in something like the prisca theologia
of Patristic and Renaissance esoteric thinkers, he ranged across the
breadth of Western and ancient Mediterranean history.21 There was
something eclectic about Joseph Smith—he was a syncretist or a
bricoleur or, as he and his followers saw it, a prophet. Smith situated himself ﬁrmly within historic Christianity—or at least a reenvisioned Christian history. For someone who was continually translating, seeing to the
center of things, magic was the wrong word to describe what Smith was
pursuing.
In his inﬂuential essay “What a Difference a Difference Makes,”
Jonathan Z. Smith argues that communities and observers emphasize
difference when it is informative or required to differentiate conceptually
adjacent entities.22 Mormons strenuously rejected the comparison to
Western esoteric traditions in part because there are important similarities between the traditions. But that is only a partial explanation of why
Smith and his followers have been so reluctant to allow others to classify
them as representatives of Western esoteric traditions. The important
question is not whether Smith’s apparent innovations can be classed as
metaphysical or esoteric or magical. Smith and the other metaphysicians
were all rebels against the Protestant mainstream, some similarities are
readily apparent, and “Western esotericism” is nebulous enough to allow
a comparison even without strong evidence of a direct link. The more
important question is why Smith so adamantly rejected the association.
To my mind, there are four principal reasons that Smith rejected claims
of dependence on Western esotericism.
First, comparisons to magic or esotericism were generally pejorative
partisanship. Smith was a biblical prophet building a biblical Zion, and
20. Samuel M. Brown, “Relics, Graves, and the Treasure Quest,” chap. 3 in In Heaven
as It Is on Earth: Joseph Smith and the Early Mormon Conquest of Death (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
21. Matthew Bowman and I cover these topics in our study “Fragments of Mormonism,” currently in preparation.
22. Smith, Relating Religion, 251–302.
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allowing for allegiances with dark arts, however much he thought he
could see the meaningful reality behind some esoteric practices, prevented his more important work of recovering ancient biblical religion.
The one esoteric tradition Smith explicitly embraced was Masonry, during its post-Morgan resurgence. Masonry was on its way back to cultural
dominance, and Smith was building an empire on the Mississippi. He
hoped Nauvoo, his Zionic city-state, would be the greatest city in America. Masonry had the potential to help in this grand effort. (Some have
overstated this point in the past—Smith was not using Masonry solely
for political advantage.) Denial is what people tend to do when they are
placed in a blighted remainder, particularly when that classiﬁcation is
meant to prevent their social progress.
Second, Smith was in competition with other rebel traditions during
this period of dramatic religious growth in America. Other groups—
Shakers, Universalists, the followers of various charismatic prophets—
represented competing paths to religious enlightenment critical of
normative Protestantism. So, frankly, did radical Methodism in its beginnings. Though they inhabited a cultural space recognizable to outsiders,
Mormons and these other groups competed with each other. Much as ostensibly ecumenical Protestants recognized a body of Christ but fought
each other for converts, so did sectarians compete outside the evangelical
establishment.
Third, Smith was attempting to build a coherent community, a
church. Smith’s important 1842 editorial titled “Try the Spirits” was all
about constraining supernatural power for the purpose of establishing
a stable society. The editorial announced the importance of distinguishing normative (priesthood-based) supernatural encounters from those
mediated by “necromancers, soothsayers, and astrologers.”23 Smith, implicitly following a long interpretive tradition (which Styers describes
in some depth, most visibly in association with Durkheim), used magic
as a marker for centrifugal, anti-communal behaviors that imperil the
23. [Joseph Smith and coauthors], “Try the Spirits,” Times and Seasons 3 (1 April 1842):
745.
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integrity of a church. Smith was adamantly communalist in his vision
and his theology. The “metaphysical” traditions contained anarchic tendencies as witnessed by the common centrifugalism of esotericism. The
Shakers struggled during the charismatic Era of Manifestations to control
the power unleashed. So did Methodists and Baptists during their early
development in America. Mormons faced similar problems. American
esoteric traditions were powerfully independent, whereas Smith was
crafting a coherent community for the ages.
Fourth and most importantly, Smith rejected the Protestant formulation of history and ecclesial authority. Smith had a complex relationship
with the Enlightenment, but whatever the speciﬁcs of that relationship,
he was assiduously anti-Protestant. Allowing Protestant control of terminology (like magic or occult) to describe his rejection of Protestant
norms would have meant ceding to Protestantism moral and cultural authority over Mormonism. That was intolerable for a movement so
adamant that the entire ediﬁce of Protestantism was a lie. Mormons were
the only true Christian church, not a post-Protestant sect with some esoteric tendencies. And while the attitudes dismissed as magic were a potent rejection of the excesses of modernism, the opprobrium attached to
the term was enough to require the rejection of the framing itself.
Few if any scholars would still be comfortable using the term magic
world view to describe much of anything. But the term magic remains important to practitioners and participants. While the jargon often obfuscates
more than it clariﬁes, for the last half century many scholars in the humanities have used the adjectives emic and etic to describe concepts that are
meaningful to insiders/participants (emic) versus outsiders/observers
(etic). Whatever terminology is used, the current scholarly consensus is
that magic is an emic rather than an etic concept or category: participants
know what the word means and use it in their interpretation of their and
others’ lives and beliefs, but “magic” functions poorly as an analytic category for scholars. To call something “magic” is to engage it as an insider
embroiled in partisan conﬂicts. It is not an act of scholarly comparison.
Given that discourse about magic expresses emic rather than etic perspectives, that Mormons rejected associations with magic, and that magic is

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014

15

Mormon Studies Review, Vol. 1 [2014], No. 1, Art. 13
130 Mormon Studies Review

usually a shorthand for some other conﬂict or point of comparison, I
doubt that the term magic is of any real utility for scholarly understanding
of Mormonism.
The title of Quinn’s Magic World View can serve as a thought experiment to illustrate my point. The original title is roughly synonymous
with Early Mormonism and the Crazy World View or Early Mormons
Were Superstitious! or Early Mormonism and the Demonic World View.
Assuming that content follows title, a more academic approach might
have been titled Mormonism and the Fight against Modernity or Antebellum Folk Religion and Early Mormonism or Early Mormonism and the
Persistence of Pre-Modern Atlantic Culture. I am not arguing that Quinn
sinned in the 1980s by titling his book or writing the way he did. I’m arguing that he was participating in insider polemics in a way many scholars (both inside and outside Mormonism) once did. From a temporal
and academic distance we can see, though, that this approach is no longer
terribly relevant.
Were early Mormons magicians? Was Joseph Smith the Wizard of
Oz? Recent scholarship makes clear that framing the topic like this begs
the question in the pedantic sense of the phrase: the question itself deﬁnes
the answer. There is no real answer because it is not a question; it is an assertion. When Mormons rejected accusations of magical or occult ties,
they were not dissembling. They were saying something very important
and true. Framing Mormonism as magic wears a patina of science, but it
invokes a troubled, methodologically ﬂawed legacy. Contemporary analytic methods and interpretive traditions make possible investigations that
can move well beyond prior efforts.
Joseph Smith and his early followers present an illuminating test case
for evaluating the meaning and signiﬁcance of the academic practice of
categorization and classiﬁcation. The Mormons remind us how often the
distance required for scholarship proves shorter than hoped, like a map
that crumples under pinched ﬁngers. Particularly when it comes to societal master narratives like science, Enlightenment, magic, and metaphysics, scholars and participants must attend very carefully to their
personal views and concerns. Without such methodological caution,
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insights and inferences are likely to be misguided and misleading. Such
has been the case with discussions about Mormonism and magic, but
thanks to recent excellent scholarship, this need no longer be the case.
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